By Alexandros Petersen | EUobserver
BRUSSELS - It
is no secret that Russian dominance of European natural gas markets has
splintered the Union.
The imperative
of having enough heat or cooking fuel in the winter has put countries –
especially in central and eastern Europe – in two camps: those who make
bilateral deals with Russia’s energy behemoth Gazprom (Western unity be
damned), and those who suffer from the disunity and call continually not just
for co-ordinated policies to withstand Moscow’s pressure, but also for
alternative resources from the Caspian region or elsewhere to diversify supply.
The second camp
has it right, but they – as well as Euro-Atlantic institutions – have sabotaged
their own efforts by seeking to dictate terms to alternative producers, such as
Azerbaijan.
All the while,
the pro-Russia camp has made gains.
Earlier in March, Serbia passed a constitutional amendment on land
ownership to make it easier for Gazprom to buy up the land it needs for a major
pipeline project aimed at increasing southeastern Europe’s dependence on
Russian resources and defeating regional plans for diversification. This follows
Germany’s joint development with Russia of the Nord Stream pipeline, which
connects German consumers directly to Russian fields across the Baltic Sea. It
bypasses and undermines the energy security of fellow Nato and European Union
members, Poland and the Baltic states.
The problem
with these policies is that in making a bilateral deal with Gazprom on natural
gas supply, individual European countries are in fact coming in line with
Kremlin policy which seeks to divide and conquer the continent.
Not only is
energy geopolitics an acknowledged tool of Moscow’s foreign policy – it says so
clearly in Russia’s national security doctrine – but maintaining “security of
demand” in Europe is one of the only ways that Russia can ensure its economy
stays afloat.
Some efforts
have been made to ameliorate the problem.
Small
interconnector pipelines have been built to move gas from one European country
to another should Russia cut off gas supplies, as it has in winters past. The
EU’s so-called Third Energy Package has provisions for combating front
companies and corruption associated with Russian energy concerns in Europe.
But, the main
solution to this conundrum has been clear for over a decade and a half: bring
non-Russian gas to European markets along a route that does not traverse
territory over which Russia has influence.
The US special
envoy for Eurasian energy, a position which existed in various guises during
the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations, was tasked specifically with
making this happen.
Myriad European
governments and companies have been involved in pushing for the so-called
Nabucco pipeline to the Caspian through Turkey, but few have committed
concretely to making it happen.
So, after years
of stalling, the Shah Deniz consortium in Azerbaijan – the holder of the
alternative gas - has decided to build its own pipeline from Baku to the EU
border.
From there they
must choose one of two routes: so-called Nabucco West going north to Austria
and Central Europe, or the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline through Greece and the
Western Balkans to Italy. The transatlantic discussion, in Washington and
Brussels, has long been in favor of the Nabucco option, in whatever form it
takes, because of the history of Western plans that went nowhere.
But when it comes
down to it, this choice is not up to European consumers or Western strategists.
Those with the
gas, Shah Deniz members BP, Statoil, Total, and most importantly the
Azerbaijani state energy company Socar, will be the ones to decide.
Instead of
debating a choice which is not theirs to make, Western governments should be
courting Caspian producers.
Beyond Shah
Deniz lies Azerbaijan’s immense Absheron field, as well as gargantuan reserves
in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.
Azerbaijan
could not only serve as a source of gas, but a bridge to more resources. The
idea that some European states are courting Russia instead of Caspian producers
approaches the absurd.
The fact that
those strategically-minded enough to look towards the Caspian seek to dictate
terms to the producers needed for their own energy security is self-defeating.
The writer is
an advisor with the European Energy Security Initiative at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars in Washington and the author of The World
Island: Eurasian Geopolitics and the Fate of the West
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